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NOTES
HOW BROAD IS NARROW CERTIORARI?
Administrative tribunals,' hybrid progeny of legislatures, were necessi-
tated by the growth and complication of our society and economy. In Penn-
sylvania, as elsewhere, they continue to grow in number and power, because
they desirably combine facility, promptness, and expertise. However, while
they greatly alleviate the burden on our court system, they create a multitude
of complex problems in their own right. One of the more serious of these
problems is to what extent these administrative tribunals may operate free of
judicial supervision. Although it is clear that they are not courts in the usual
sense, they do exercise judicial, or as is more often said, quasi-judicial powers.
Since the government of Pennsylvania, like that of the Federal government, is
based on a system of checks and balances, it would seem that when the General
Assembly creates a judicial or quasi-judicial body which operates independently
of the judicial branch, they are by their encroachment violating the system.
Although intermediate interpretation or application of the law by admin-
istrative tribunals may be unobjectionable on the ground that their decision,
if erroneous, may be corrected by judicial review, it does seem that any attempt
by the legislature to grant exclusive jurisdiction to bodies other than courts
should not be countenanced. Nevertheless, the General Assembly of Pennsyl-
vania has in many instances declared that certain tribunals shall have exclusive
jurisdiction and that their decision shall not be subject to appeal or review
by any court of the state.' Although the constitutionality of such statutory
efforts has not been questioned, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has ruled
that the General Assembly may not derogate the court's constitutional power
to issue a certiorari a to any body which exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
power. This position seems sound and in accord with the use of certiorari at
1 For the purpose of this article the term "administrative tribunal" includes any body which
exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions and does not proceed in the manner of Common Law
courts. This definition includes Common Law courts when they exercise special statutory jurisdic-
tion and depart from their usual method of procedure.
2 Court of Quarter Sessions exercising a special statutory jurisdiction under First Class Town-
ship Code, Act of May 27, 1949, P.L. 1955, 53 P.S. 19092-403; Department of Banking, Banking
Code, 1933, May 15, P.L. 624, art. XIV, § 1406 C, 7 P.S. 819-1406C; Board of Arbitration and
Claims, Act of May 20, 1937, P.L. 728, 72 P.S. § 4651. Board of Finance and Revenue, Act of
April 9, 1929, P.L. 343, § 503, 72 P.S. § 503.




Common Law,' and except for an occasional wayward decision,' the Court
has firmly adhered to it.' But the fact that an administrative tribunal's decision
or order may be reviewed is meaningless unless the scope of such review is
known. Unfortunately the Court has been neither clear nor consistent on this
point, but on the contrary it has by vague and variable language and conflicting
results, made this one of the haziest areas of Pennsylvania law.
One of the factors contributing to the confusion is the Act of May 18,
1919, which resulted in a distinction between "broad" and "narrow" certiorari.
The statute is still in effect and as a result, review of decisions of administrative
tribunals, when appeal is prohibited, is said to be on a narrow certiorari.'
Although the Act is responsible for broadening the review on certiorari in
some cases it has no effect on certiorari to administrative tribunals whose
decisions are not subject to appeal. Consequently an examination of pre-1919
as well as post-1919 cases is necessary to any study of narrow certiorari.
PRE-1919
Prior to the Act of 1919, there was no "broad" or "narrow" certiorari,
only Common Law certiorari. It was not necessary to prohibit appeal prior to
the Act since the rule was-where the legislature created an administrative
tribunal and did not provide for appeal, no appeal could be had.' This omis-
sion did not, however, prevent the Court from issuing the Common Law writ
of certiorari.' When the Supreme Court issued the writ to a lower court 'o
there was no dispute as to its effect. The writ brought up the record which
was examined to determine whether or not the court below had jurisdiction
and whether or not its proceedings were regular; in keeping with the highly
formalized practice typical of the early Common Law courts, the merits of the
case could not be considered. If an appellant wished his case to be considered
on the merits he had to use the proper remedy, i.e. appeal or writ of error.
Either of these gave the aggrieved party a right to have the case reviewed on
4 Smith v. Cross, (1703) 7 Mod. Rep. 138, 87 E.R. 1148; sub non Cross v. Smith, 2 Ld.
Raymd. 836, 12 Mod. Rep. 643, 1 Salk 148, 3 Salk 79; Grenville v. College of Physicians, (1700)
12 Mod. Rep. 386, 88 E.R. 1398; Ball v. Pattridge (1666), 1 Sid. 296, 82 E.R. 1116.
5 See In re Shorts Estate, 315 Pa. 561, 173 At. 319 (1934); Explained in Hotel Casey Co.
v. Ross, 343 Pa. 573, 23 A.2d 737 (1942); See also dissenting opinion of Jones, J. in Delaware
County National Bank v. Campbell, 378 Pa. 311, 328, 106 A.2d 416 (1954).
6 Robb's Nomination, 188 Pa. 212, 41 At. 477 (1898); Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. Myers,
388 Pa. 444, 130 A.2d 686 (1957).
7 Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. Myers, rupra note 6.
8 Appeal of Commissioners of Northampton County, supra note 3; Independence Party Nom-
ination, 208 Pa. 108, 57 Atd. 344 (1904).
9 Robb's Nomination, 138 Pa. 212, 41 Atl. 477 (1898).
10 The term court is used exclusively in reference to judicial bodies proceeding in the course
of the Common Law as opposed to administrative tribunals defined in note 1, supra.
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the merits, and although this right could be lost by failure to comply with
procedural rules, the remedy did exist.
In contrast, an appeal or writ of error, except by statute, is not appropriate
to administrative tribunals because they are not courts. Therefore, the only
method of obtaining review when the legislature did not provide for an appeal,
was by certiorari.1 Despite this singularity of remedy, the Court originally
refused to distinguish between a certiorari to an administrative tribunal and
one issued to a lower court where other remedies were available. This early
inflexibility is aptly illustrated by the language of Justice Sharswood in Carpen-
ter's Appeal " which was from an administrative tribunal:
"Upon a common law certiorari, as this, we can only examine the record to
see if the court had jurisdiction and the proceedings were regular. This has
been so often decided that it is to be hoped that sometime or other parties will
leave off bringing such cases into this court, with the idea that they may get the
proceedings reversed on the merits." 13
In subsequent decisions the court adherred to this view and said that on
a certiorari, in any case, they could do no more than determine whether or not
the court below had jurisdiction and whether or not its proceedings were
regular.' There were, however, many decisions which indicated otherwise,
as for example The Appeal of the Commissioners of Northampton County
where the court said:
"It is beyond all question that ... this court is authorized to examine and
review the proceedings . . .and determine the extent and limits of its (the
tribunal below) power and regularity of its exercise." (Emphasis added.)
The Court then went on to say that the Court of Quarter Sessions sitting as an
administrative tribunal did not have the "power" to withdraw, more than a
year later, the approval it had given to the plans for construction of a new
county jail. The Court of Quarter Sessions had exclusive jurisdiction by statute
and since the General Assembly had not provided for appeal the case was
before the court on a certiorari. There was no mention of lack of jurisdiction
or regularity of proceedings," the only basis for reversal being that the Court
of Quarter Sessions had misinterpreted the statute and exercised "power" not
IL Robb's Nomination, 138 Pa. 212, 41 At. 477 (1898).
1211 W. N. C. 162 (1882).
1 A review on the merits is one based on substantive law as opposed to formal requirements.
14 Election Cases, 65 Pa. 20 (1870).
1557 Pa. 452, 453 (1868).
16 Although the case was heard before the Court of Quarter Sessions, the proceedings were not




granted thereby. More briefly stated, they had committed an error of law and
this was ground for reversal.
Still later, it was said in In re Germantown Avenue:"
"We cannot on a certiorari reverse the findings of the learned judge upon
the facts, neither can we reverse his rulings upon the law, where they are the
logical deductions from the facts as found." (Emphasis added.)
The significance of these cases can only be appreciated if one understands
that a review on a certiorari was limited to questions of jurisdiction and
regularity of proceedings because a certiorari brought up only the record,
consisting of docket entries and formal proceedings. The record does not
include the opinion or reasons for the decision "8 and yet both the Northampton
and Germantown cases went beyond the record, otherwise it would have been
impossible to ascertain that the tribunal below had exceeded its power in the
one case, or made a ruling upon the law which was not a logical deduction
from the facts as found in the other case. Consequently these cases overcame
the real obstacle to adequate review of administrative tribunals' decisions.
They simply broadened the record. This paved the way for the opinion in
Independence Party Nomination " where the court said:
"As a general rule the opinion of the court is not part of the record strictly
so-called, and in common law actions the review on a certiorari is confined to
the judgment without reference to the reasons of the court in entering it. In
equity suits the rule is the other way and the reason and the opinions of the
chancellor are always open to an examination to discover the grounds of his
action. Proceedings on a summary petition, like the present, occupy a middle
ground. They are not open to a review on the merits, but as a mere inspection
of the docket entries or the formal proceedings would disclose nothing, we must
look at the opinion as well as the action of the court to see the basis on which
it acted. Thus in regard to licenses to sell liquor, it was said in Pollard's
Petition, 127 Pa. 507(522) 'the granting of wholesale liquor licenses is a
matter specially committed by act of Assembly to the Courts of Quarter Ses-
sions. Upon the Writ of Certiorari we may review their proceedings so far as
to see whether they have kept within the limits of the powers thus conferred,
and have exercised them in conformity with the law. We are of the opinion
that these powers have been exceeded and that upon the face of the record the
petitioner was entitled to her license.' We may therefore examine the opinion
of the court below so far as to ascertain the basis of its action." (Emphasis
added.)
While it is true that Independence Party did not hold that findings of fact
by administrative tribunals might upon a certiorari be reviewed and reversed,
17 99 Pa. 479, 483 (1882).
18 Chase v. Miller, 41 Pa. 403 (1862).
19 208 Pa. 108, 57 At. 344 (1904).
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it does stand for the proposition that the Court has the power on a certiorari
to examine the opinion, determine the basis for the decision, and correct all
errors of law.2 0  Since this power is of constitutional derivation it should re-
main unaffected by any statute.2 1  The Court took the position that the legisla-
ture might very well create bodies which are not courts and assign to them the
function of intermediately interpreting and applying the law, but they could
not infringe upon the authority of the Supreme Court to ultimately decide
questions of law. So long as this view prevailed administrative tribunals
could not summarily misapply or override the law. A mere inspection of the
record to determine jurisdiction and regularity of proceedings does not have
this effect. Thus, prior to 1919, the only distinction between review on appeal
and a review on a certiorari was that on a certiorari the court would not
examine the testimony or disturb findings of fact, but would correct errors
of law. 2
POST-1919
The Act of May 9, 1889, by providing that all appellate proceedings
before the Supreme Court shall be called "appeals" affected the writ of cer-
tiorari in name only.23 However, the Act of May 18, 1919, did more, by
providing that:
I.. . in any proceedings heretofore or hereafter had in any court of record
of this Commonwealth where the testimony has been or shall be taken by
witnesses, depositions, or otherwise, and where an appeal has been or shall
hereafter be taken from the order, sentence, decree or judgment, entered in
said proceedings, to the Superior or Supreme Court such testimony shall be filed
in said proceedings, and the effect of said appeal shall be to remove, for the
consideration of the appellate court, the testimony taken in the court from
which the appeal is taken, and the same shall be reviewed by the appellate court
as a part of the record, with like effect as upon an appeal from a judgment en-
20 Error of law as used here does not include findings of fact contra to the weight of the
evidence.
2t Pa. Const. art. V, sec. 3 (1874). Note that the Court of Common Pleas does not have power
to issue certiorari to administrative tribunals but only to lower courts. Nobles v. Pillet, 16 Pa. Super.
386. Although the Superior Court does not have any constitutional power nor any express statutory
power to issue the writ, they did in several cases issue it to administrative tribunals from which
appeal was prohibited under their "general supervisory power." Mark's License, 115 Pa. Super.
256, 176 Atd. 254 (1934); Neptune Club's Liquor License, 124 Pa. Super. 549, 190 Atd. 156 (1937).
These and similiar cases followed Independence Party Nomination, 208 Pa. 108, 57 Atl. 344 (1904).
22 In Michigan the same result was reached by a ruling that certiorari is not limited to jurisdic-
tion and regularity of proceedings in any case. Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. 111, 77 Am. Dec. 491
(1860). In Utah the court held the writ to be limited but declared all errors of law to be errors
of jurisdiction. County Board of Equalization v. State Tax Commissioner, 88 Utah 219, 50 P.2d
418, (1935). For an opinion using language almost identical with Independence Party Nomination,
see Milwaukee Iron Co. v. Schubel, 29 Wis. 444 (1872). Certiorari will not generally lie to review
decisions of Federal administrative tribunals. Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U.S. 162 (1913).23 Rand v. King, 134 Pa. 641, 19 At. 806 (1890); Rimer's Contested Election, 316 Pa. 324,
175 Atl. 544 (1934).
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tered upon the verdict of a jury in an action at law, and the appeal so taken
shall not have the effect only of a certiorari to review the regularity of the pro-
ceedings of the court below."
The broadest interpretation of this statute, if made, would eliminate any
difference between certiorari and appeal. If the words "any proceedings" and
"court of record" refer to administrative tribunals as well as to courts, and it
seems that they do,2" it would logically follow that where a certiorari would
lie before, an appeal could now be had. Although the Supreme Court did
construe the Act to include administrative tribunals, they did not so broadly
interpret the Act. Instead, after a somewhat stumbling search the court con-
cluded that there are now two types of certiorari, broad and narrow.
Broad certiorari is simply the certiorari of old, implemented by the Act
of 1919. The scope of review on a broad certiorari is clearly set forth in the
statute and the court has held that it will lie to administrative tribunals only
when the General Assembly does not prohibit appeal. Apparently on the basis
of whatsoever the General Assembly giveth, the General Assembly may taketh
away, it is said that broad certiorari will not lie where the legislature expressly
prohibits appeal;" or where it declares that the decisions of the tribunal shall
be final 2 or conclusive," or remain unaffected. 8 In this event the act of 1919
does not operate and the certiorari which lies is called narrow certiorari. Thus,
if the statute creating an administrative tribunal is silent as to appeal, a broad
review may be had; but if by any appropriate verbiage an appeal is prohibited,
only a narrow review is allowed.
The puzzling title of this article merely restates the question-what is the
scope of this narrow review? The pre-1919 cases seem to provide a ready
made answer. Since the Supreme Court's power to issue a certiorari is by virtue
of a constitutional provision,2 9 it may not be taken away or lessened by stat-
ute,8" and since Independence Party Nomination clearly stated the scope of
review on a certiorari as it existed without modification by the Act of 1919,
how can there be any doubt as to the scope of narrow certiorari? Perhaps the
use of the word "narrow" misled the court, for it is clearly a misnomer. A
certiorari is a certiorari and the fact that a legislative provision may make it
broader in some cases does not necessitate the conclusion that it becomes more
24 The Act was applied to broaden review of decisions of statutory tribunals. Rimer's Contested
Election, supra note 23.
29Kaufman Construction Co. v. Holcomb, 357 Pa. 514, 55 A.2d 534, 174 A.L.R. 189, (1947).
20Grimes v. Dept. of Public Instruction, 324 Pa. 371, 188 Atd. 337 (1936); White Twp.
School Directors Appeal, 300 Pa. 422, 150 At. 744 (1930).2 7 Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. Myers, 388 Pa. 444, 130 A.2d 686 (1957).
28 Commonwealth v. Cierce, 286 Pa. 296, 133 At. 795 (1926).
29 Pa. Const. art V, sec. 3 (1874).
30 Robb's Nomination, 188 Pa. 212 (1898).
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narrow in all the others. However, this was the conclusion reached in Twenty-
first Senatorial District Nomination,3 decided in 1924, where the court in
rejecting the pre-1919 position as stated in Independence Party Nomination
rather vaguely said:
"Where in a statutory proceeding, the legislature fails to provide for an
appeal, and because of that omission, the action of the tribunal involved is
generally speaking, considered final, a certiorari to inspect the record, in the
broadest sense allowed by our cases, may nevertheless issue; but where the
legislature, as in the statute before us particularly states that no appeal shall
be permitted, then review, beyond determining questions of jurisdiction,
cannot be had, and under circumstances such as those at bar, a certiorari for
the latter purpose cannot be broadened into something more extensive, either
by our prior rulings on the general subject in hand, or by the operation of the
Act of April 18, 1919, P. L. 72."
This language seemed to indicate that the court was reverting to the very early
view on certiorari and disregarding entirely Independence Party. Subse-
quently, in Sterret v. MacLean 3 there was again an about face. The court
said:
. . . yet we are entitled, as we said in Independence Party Nomination, 208
Pa. 108, 111,-under the general supervisory powers of the court on cer-
tiorari,°to inspect the whole record with regard to the regularity and propriety
of the proceedings to ascertain whether the court below exceeded its juris-
diction or its proper legal discretion: See Pollard's Petition, 127 Pa. 507, 527."
Since the case was before the court on a narrow certiorari it seemed that the
method by which the General Assembly prohibited appeal (pre-1919 they had
only to remain silent on the question while post-1919 they had to use particular
words) did not matter. So long as the proceedings are summary, i.e. out of
the course of the Common Law, the court would on certiorari correct errors
of law.
The obvious conflict of Sterret v. MacLean and Twenty-first Senatorial
District caused some difficulty. So in 1934 the Court undertook to finally settle
the question in Rimer's Contested Election.3 It is unfortunate that the Court
did not choose a case in which the scope of review on narrow certiorari was in
•11 293 Pa. 557, 560, 143 At. 189, 190 (1928). See also Foy's Election, 228 Pa. 14, 76 Atl.
713 (1910); Twenty-eighth Congressional Dist. Nomination, 268 Pa. 313, 112 At. 74; Bauman
Election Contest Case, 351 Pa. 451, 41 A.2d 630 (1945).
32281 Pa. 273, 279, 126 Atl. 566, 568 (1924). See also Comm. v. Cierce, 286 Pa. 296, 133
Atl. 795 (1926); Bangor's Electric Co. Petition, 295 Pa. 228, 145 Atd. 128 (1929).
33 316 Pa. 324, 175 At. 544 (1934).
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issue. Instead, in Rimer's, which was before them on a broad certiorari the
court dogmatically declared that:
1. When the General Assembly was silent as to appeal the Act
of 1919 applied and a broad review, that is a review identical with
that on an appeal, would be given.
2. When the General Assembly prohibited appeal certiorari
would lie only in the narrow sense and the Court could do no more
than determine whether or not the tribunal had jurisdiction and had
proceeded in a regular manner.
3. Election cases are an exception to the rule and on a narrow
certiorari, regardless of legislative action, review of election cases
(which are tried before administrative tribunals) will always be at
least broad enough to permit correction of errors of law.
The Court went on to say that the rule in Independence Party Nomination
and other cases following it " was applicable only to election cases. It should
be noted, however, that in all of the cases in which the rule was applied there
was no distinction made between election cases and other types of cases. The
distinction that was made is that election cases are tried by a tribunal proceed-
ing in a summary manner, as opposed to other cases tried before courts pro-
ceeding in the course of the Common Law. But this is true of all cases tried
before administrative tribunals and there seems no good basis for restricting
the rule to election cases, particularly since a liquor licensing case is cited as
authority in Independence Party Nomination.
Whether or not theoretically correct, Rimer's purported to establish the
scope of narrow certiorari and was followed in later cases " which declared
that where a statute expressly provides that there shall be no appeal, the merits
of the controversy cannot be considered even though the interpretation given
to the facts or the law by the governmental agency below may have been
erroneous. After the rules espoused in Rimer's became firmly entrenched there
again came the effort to broaden the scope of review. The task was not an
easy one. One method of accomplishing it was illustrated in Grimes v. De-
partment of Public Instruction.' The court there held, in effect, that when an
administrative tribunal commits an error of law, if exceeds its jurisdiction.
3 Cases cited note 32 supra.
5 Comm. v. Cronin, 336 Pa. 469, 9 A.2d 408 (1939); In re Elkland, 330 Pa. 78, 148 Atd.
13 (1938); State Board of Undertakers v. Frankinfield, 329 Pa. 440, 198, Atd. 302 (1938); Phila-
delphia Saving Fund Society v. Banking Board of Pa., 383 Pa. 253, 118 A.2d 272 (1956); Swank
v. Myers, 386 Pa. 331, 126 A.2d 267 (1956).
a Cases cited note 26 supra.
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The Court said that although an administrative tribunal's construction of the
law is persuasive, it cannot by erroneous construction enlarge or diminish its
jurisdiction. This theory that errors of law constitute errors of jurisdiction
clashed with earlier rulings that jurisdiction is something different than power
and is nothing more than the competency to "determine controversies of the
general class to which the case presented for its (the tribunal's) consideration
belongs." " This earlier theory prevailed and the rule of the Grimes case was
discarded. The Court was then left with the very limited power, on narrow
certiorari, to determine whether or not the tribunal was competent to try cases
of the general class of the one involved and whether or not the proceedings
were regular.
Our Court was not so obtuse that it did not recognize this as a threat to the
tenet that ours shall be a government of laws and not of men. With such a
limited power of review they could do nothing to prevent abuse of power by
the tribunals. If tribunals decided to vary their interpretation and application
of the law from case to case, nothing could be done to correct the resulting
injustice. In Hotel Casey Co. v. Ross " the Court made a violent extension
of the use of mandamus "9 in order to reverse a decision of the Board of Finance
and Revenue. The sole basis for the reversal was the Board's misinterpretation
of the statute. Again the Court was seeking to circumvent the harsh rule result-
ing from the dicta of Rimer's Contested Election in order to correct an error of
law. But alas, this too did pass, for in Kaufman Construction v. Holcomb ,
it was said that mandamus could not be used as a means of circumventing the
General Assembly's prohibition of appeal. This was followed by a lengthy
discussion of narrow certiorari concluded by a reiteration of the supposed rule
of Rimer's case. The Court was not at all disturbed by the fact that in a case
not directly involving narrow certiorari they were attempting to decide its scope
and were using as authority an earlier case in which narrow certiorari was not
at all in issue.4
Thus far each attempt to insure that every man would have his day in
court, had met with failure. The court complacently refused, on narrow cer-
tiorari, to do more than determine whether or not the tribunal had jurisdiction
.17 Skelton v. Lower Merion Twp., 298 Pa. 471, 148 At. 846 (1930); Witney v. Lebanon City,
369 Pa. 308, 85 A.2d 106 (1952); Koontz v. Messner, 314 Pa. 434, 172 At. 457 (1934).
38 343 Pa. 573, 23 A.2d 737 (1942).
39 "The principle is well established that mandamus lies to compel the performance of a minis-
terial act, but it is equally well established that the writ will not issue, where a body clothed with
deliberative and discretionary powers has acted, to compel a revision or modification of its de-
cision; . . . Reese v. Board of Mine Examiners, 248 Pa. 617, 622, 94 Atd. 246, 248 (1915).4 0 Supra, note 25. But see Arthur v. Pittsburgh, 330 Pa. 202, 198 Atl. 637 (1938).
41 In Rimer's Contested Election the case was before the Court on a broad certiorari and the
Kaufman Constr. Co. v. Holcomb case was before the Court on a writ of alternative mandamus.
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or whether or not the proceedings were regular, 2 until Dauphin Deposit Trust
Company v. Myers; " where once again the court made an effort to preserve the
judiciary's right to rule ultimately on questions of law. The manner in which
they did it is open to much criticism.
It is said in the opinion that: "There is no doubt that the Department of
Banking misinterpreted . . . the act." " The review was upon a narrow cer-
tiorari and in both the headnotes and the body of the opinion appears the
declaration that the ". . . review is limited to the question of jurisdiction and
the regularity of proceedings; the merits of the controversy cannot be con-
sidered even though the interpretation given to the facts or the law by the
governmental agency or the Court below may have been erroneous." " Since
the Court also says that jurisdiction relates solely to the competency to determine
controversies of the general class to which the case in question belongs, and
that it is "clear as crystal" " that the Department of Banking had jurisdiction
and that its proceedings were regular, it seems a little peculiar that the Court
should have reversed the Department of Banking's order. Nevertheless the
Court did reverse, on the basis that by misinterpreting the statute the Depart-
ment had exceeded its statutory powers.
Although the language of Dauphin Deposit is reminiscent of Sterret v.
MacLean and some of the pre-1919 cases,4" there is no reference to them. In-
stead the Court relied for authority on three Federal cases.4" Regardless of the
method, the Court accomplished the feat of restoring the scope of review
warranted by the pre-1919 cases, and again provided a method of preventing
abuse of power by administrative tribunals, for if it is not within administrative
tribunals' statutory powers to misinterpret the statute it would logically follow
that it is also not within their power to misapply or override the law. In short,
every error of law amounts to an "excess of powers."
The Dauphin Deposit case was quickly affirmed in Scott Township Ap-
peal" where the Court in reversing the decision of an administrative tribunal
because of an erroneous interpretation of the statute said that on a narrow
42 Philadelphia Saving Fund Society v. Board of Banking of Pa., 383 Pa. 233, 118 A.2d 561
(1955); Addison Case, 385 Pa. 48, 122 A.2d 272 (1956); Swank v. Myers, 386 Pa. 331, 126 A.2d
267 (1956); Delaware County National Bank v. Campbell, 378 Pa. 311, 106 A.2d 416 (1954).
42 388 Pa. 444, 130 A.2d 686 (1957).
44 Id at 459, 130 A.2d at 694.
45 Id at 444, 460, 130 A.2d at 687, 694.
46 Id at 461, 130 A.2d at 694.
47Robb's Nomination, 138 Pa. 212, 41 Att. 477 (1898); Appeal of Commissioners of
Northhampton County, 57 Pa. 452 (1868). See also White Township School Directors Appeal, 300
Pa. 422, 150 Atl. 744 (1950) where "scope of power" is also used.
48 Cf. United States v. Walker, 109 U.S. 258, 266 (1883); Bigelow v. Forrest, 9 Wall. 339
(1869); Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1873).
49 388 Pa. 539, 130 A.2d 695 (1957).
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certiorari it will now "direct its inquiry to (1) the jurisdiction of the court
below, (2) the regularity of the proceedings therein held, and (3) the scope
of powers possessed by the court." "
Even though these two cases do not explicitly renounce Rimer's and
Twenty-first Senatorial District they do, in terms of result, overrule them. It
seems, therefore, that there is now a return to the view of Independence Party
and that on a narrow certiorari the Court will examine the opinion, determine
the basis of the decision and correct errors of law found, regardless of legislative
attempts to enjoin or limit judicial review. Thus narrow certiorari differs from
broad certiorari and appeal only in that the Court does not on narrow certiorari
have the power to review the testimony and may not disturb the findings of
fact made below.5
In view of the conflicting language of Dauphin Deposit and the failure
to explain the term "power", the interpretation given the case may be too
broad. But it does seem a logical one and is supported by the Scott Township
case where the same Court, using the Dauphin Deposit case as authority, gave a
review on the legal merits of the case. The only way the Court may, with
certainty, preserve the power to ultimately rule on the law, and insure that
there will be a method of preventing abuse of power and discretion by adminis-
trative tribunals is to clearly overrule those cases which render judicial review
impotent. Without this it shall always be possible to upset the view of the
Dauphin Deposit case and the Scott Township case.
"Wherever the right to review exists, the power to correct follows as a
necessary corollary ..... " " The obvious soundness of this proposition should
deter further efforts to sterilize the Court's power to review decisions of ad-
ministrative tribunals. So long as the Court adheres to that proposition,
administrative tribunals will not be free to indiscriminately misconstrue or
misapply the law. To say that administrative tribunals may proceed in a sum-
mary manner and that in deference to the technical knowledge of the members
of such tribunals the Court will lend great weight to their rulings on the law
is only to say that the benefits of such bodies will be utilized to the maximum.
But, to abandon the traditional judicial safeguards at the trial level and pro-
hibit remedy of even the most blatant injustice by limiting review is to tread
a narrow path between due process and bureaucratic tyranny. Whether the
50 ld at 541, 130 A.2d 697.
51 For an indication that the scope of review on mandamus may be equally broad or at least
unsettled, see Duncan Meter Corp. v. Gritsavage, 361 Pa. 607, 610, 65 A.2d 402, 403 (1949) where,
years after the Kaufman case the Court said: "If a (city] controller abuses discretion or acts under
a mistaken view of the law, mandamus will lie to compel proper action: Hotel Casey Co. v. Ross.
. . . (see note 38 supra).
52 Foy's Election, 228 Pa. 14, 16, 76 At. 713, 714 (1910).
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has finally taken a decisive stand on the issue,
or is merely continuing the judicial teeter-totter of the past, remains to be
seen. Because the previous inconsistency and indecision gave rise to many
unfavorable results and because experience points to the rule of the Indepen-
dence Party and Scott Township cases as the desirable result, the prognosis
is favorable."
JOHN W. PELINO and
C. RICHARD OWENS.
53 For earlier writings on narrow certiorari, see Note, Power of the Courts Over Administrative
Boards, 78 U.PA.L. REV. (1929); Reader, Methods of Judicial Review Where No Direct Appeals
Are Provided, PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION QUARTERLY, 303, 317 (1939).
